AIDS and Drug Pricing: In Search of a Policy by Salbu, Steven R.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 71 Issue 3 
January 1993 
AIDS and Drug Pricing: In Search of a Policy 
Steven R. Salbu 
University of Texas, Austin, Texas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Food and Drug Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Steven R. Salbu, AIDS and Drug Pricing: In Search of a Policy, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 691 (1993). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
AIDS AND DRUG PRICING:
IN SEARCH OF A POLICY
STEVEN R. SALBU*
In the early 1980s, doctors observed a pattern of medical symptoms
that would later be diagnosed as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS).1 A virus causes the disease, which results in a general weaken-
ing of the immune system and susceptibility to different kinds of physical
illness. The symptoms have proved fatal for hundreds of thousands of
people with AIDS (PWAs). By 1990, AIDS was the tenth leading killer
of Americans and the third most prevalent cause of death among young
Americans.2 As of September 1992, approximately 242,000 Americans
have been diagnosed as having AIDS, and the Centers for Disease Con-
trol (CDC) estimate that over half a million Americans will be diagnosed
with AIDS by 1995.1 Of those diagnosed, a disproportionate incidence
occurs among blacks4 and Hispanics.5 The CDC projects that at least
330,000 Americans will die from AIDS by 1995.6
For over a decade, scientists have attempted to find both a vaccination
and a cure for AIDS through research and development. Most research
activity occurs in private laboratories, typically located within pharma-
ceutical firms, and in university and government-supported facilities. Be-
cause federal and state7 funding supports a significant amount of both
* Assistant Professor, Legal and Ethical Environment of Business, University of Texas at
Austin. B.A., Hofstra University; M.A., Dartmouth College; J.D., The College of William and
Mary; M.A., Ph.D., The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. This Article was writ-
ten under a research grant provided by the Graduate School of Business at the University of Texas at
Austin.
1. The recognition of symptoms of AIDS can be traced back at least to 1979, when an increase
was observed in reported cases of Kaposi's sarcoma. The acknowledgement of AIDS as a disease is
generally considered to have occurred in 1981.
2. AIDS 10th Leading Killer ofAmericans in 1990, REUTER LIB. RPT., Jan. 7, 1993, Financial
Report.
3. AIDS Deaths Mount More Slowly, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1993, at A2.
4. More Casualties of AIDS, Bos. GLOBE, Jan. 2, 1993, at 10.
5. See Richard A. Knox, Burden for Puerto Ricans Reaches Crisis Stage-The Changing Face
of AIDS, Bos. GLOBE, June 18, 1990, at 1 ("AIDS incidence among Hispanics has consistently run
more than double than among whites.").
6. Amanda Husted, Health Watch CDC: 330,000 Americans Will Die From AIDS by 1995,
ALT. CONST., Jan. 15, 1993, at D3.
7. AIDS funding has been cut recently in some states, including Texas. The trend is likely to
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academic and corporate AIDS research,8 the line between public and pri-
vate initiatives is ambiguous.
To date, research has had limited applicable success, resulting in the
development of a few drugs that are used to treat patients with AIDS or
those who have been diagnosed as HIV positive but are asymptomatic.
None of the drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration are
unambiguously effective or without serious potential side effects. For
this reason, members of the medical community have questioned the ad-
visability of using several of the drugs.9
The most highly publicized controversy over AIDS drug pricing t° be-
gan in 1987, when the British pharmaceutical company Wellcome intro-
duced azidothymidine (AZT) to the American market. Wellcome
originally priced its AZT product, branded as Retrovir, at $10,000 for
annual treatment."' Industry representatives estimated Wellcome's cost
of bringing the product to market at approximately $80 million.12 Sales
of AZT quickly surpassed $220 million per year.' 3 Largely as a result of
public criticism, Wellcome reduced the annual price to approximately
$3,000 per year by 1990, still receiving a margin some have estimated to
continue, given current budgetary shortfalls. See Cindy Rugeley, Funding Cuts Over AIDS Anger
Official, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 8, 1993, at A19.
8. See infra notes 75-81, 103-105 and accompanying text.
9. For discussion of the therapeutic benefits and disadvantages of AZT, see Margaret A. Fis-
chl et al., The Efficacy of Azidothymidine (AZT) in the Treatment of Patients with AIDS and AIDS-
Related Complex A Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled Trial, 317 N. ENG. J. MED. 185 (1987);
Douglas D. Richman et al., The Toxicity of Azidothymidine (AZT) in the Treatment of Patients with
AIDS and AIDS-Related Complex: A Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled Trial, 317 N. ENG. J. MED.
192 (1987).
10. The author refers here to controversies regarding pricing of drugs for the treatment of
AIDS, but many of the observations made in this Article have obvious, broader implications regard-
ing drug pricing in general. The pharmaceutical industry is currently under congressional scrutiny
for alleged abuses. See Elyse Tanouye & Michael Waldholz, Senate Study of Drug Prices Could
Prove a Bitter Pillfor Pharmaceutical Makers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1993, at B1 (citing a forthcom-
ing senate study "expected to show that major drug companies broke public promises to hold price
increases below the inflation rate in 1992.").
11. Stephen D. Moore, CEO Robb Adds Spice to Mix of Drugs at Wellcome, WALL ST. J., Jan.
4, 1993, at B4, col. 3.
12. See BRUCE NUSSBAUM, GOOD INTENTIONS: How BIG BUSINESS AND THE MEDICAL ES-
TABLISHMENT ARE CORRUPTING THE FIGHT AGAINST AIDS 176-179 (1990). The author states
that under early congressional scrutiny, Wellcome itself estimated these costs at $80 million, but
refused to supply documentation. Nussbaum also observes that a Wellcome representative later
stated that only $30 million of that $80 million represented past expenditures. The remaining $50
million ostensibly represented future expenditure towards the marketing of AZT.
13. THOMAS L. BEAUCHAMP, AIDS and the Availability of AZT, in THOMAS L. BEAUCHAMP,
CASE STUDIES IN BUSINESS, SOCIETY AND ETHICS 207, 209 (3d ed. 1993).
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equal 70 percent of production and marketing costs. 4 According to
Wellcome's 1992 annual report, sale of AZT, under the trademark Re-
trovir, generated approximately $388 million in revenues,15 notwith-
standing successive price adjustments. 6 In tandem with a 50 percent
reduction in dosage, the annual cost of Retrovir treatment was approxi-
mately $2,500 by early 1993.17
Attempts to divest Wellcome of its patent fights to AZT have come
from several sources, including the National Institutes of Health (NIH),
competing pharmaceutical companies, and public interest groups. In
July 1991, Bernadine Healy, Director of the NIH, issued a press release
stating her belief that NIH investigators played a role in the development
of AZT as an AIDS treatment, which merited their inclusion as inven-
tors on the patent.' 8 That same year, Barr Laboratories filed an abbrevi-
ated new drug application with the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) seeking approval to manufacture a generic drug containing
AZT.19 Wellcome retaliated by suing Barr Laboratories for patent in-
fringement.20 In 1992, a judge in the District of Columbia dismissed a
case initiated against Wellcome by the People With AIDS Health Group
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.21 Most recently, Wellcome's com-
petitor Novopharm announced its plan to sell AZT without seeking a
FDA license, citing as justification its ability to reduce costs to
consumers.
22
The case of AZT is only one example of a pattern that has developed
throughout the pharmaceutical industry in the marketing and pricing of
AIDS treatments. In 1992, seven drugs prescribed for AIDS-related ill-
14. Profiting From Disease, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 1990, at 17.
15. THE WELLCOME PLC, ANNUAL REPORT 60 (1992).
16. Moore, supra note 11. Two twenty-percent price reductions followed outcry by AIDS
activists.
17. Moore, supra note 11.
18. Statement of Bernadine Healy, July 17, 1991.
19. John A. Jones, Barr Labs Boosts Earnings While Awaiting AZT Decision, INV. Bus. DAILY,
Sept. 19, 1991, at 34; Barr Labs Hopes NIH Was Co-Inventor ofAZT, 12 INSTITUTIONAL INV., INC.,
Portfolio Letter, July 29, 1991, at 3.
20. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, 143 F.R.D. 611 (E.D.N.C. 1992). The dis-
trict court granted in part and denied in part Barr's motion seeking the production by Wellcome of
357 documents.
21. People With AIDS Health Group v. Burroughs Wellcome, No. 91-0574, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 578 (D.C.D.C. Jan. 17, 1992).
22. John Crewdson, Documents May Hurt U.S. Efforts to Share Patent, Cut AZT Price, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 4, 1992, at C3.
19931
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nesses varied in average monthly price from $160 to $1,740.23 In terms
of annual costs to consumers, these drugs range from $1,920 to
$20,882.88. In a typical instance, a Swedish pharmaceutical company,
Astra, has faced activist accusations of price gouging for its $21,000 an-
nual charge for a supply of Foscavir, which is used to prevent CMV
retinitis. 24 The company defended its pricing decision, asserting the need
to recoup high research and development costs. 25 These prices, like the
price of AZT, are likely to surpass the means of many Americans, espe-
cially the uninsured. Because current prices of potentially life-sustaining
drugs are unacceptable to most consumers, the same scenario is likely to
repeat itself with each new product entry: steep prices followed by ac-
tivist outcry that eventually leads to moderate price concessions.
Critics have argued throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s that both
governmental and private research efforts are unsatisfactory. 26 They
contend that federal funding is far below the levels needed to expedite the
search for prevention and cure, resulting in past and future suffering and
mortality which could be avoided if AIDS were given greater budgetary
priority.27 This line of criticism often states or implies that governmental
restriction of AIDS spending is a result of social devaluation of two
classes of persons categorized as high-risk: male homosexuals and intra-
venous drug users.28  Critics contend that sluggish governmental re-
sponse results from the attitude that: (1) PWAs in these categories are
responsible for their illnesses; (2) people develop AIDS because of en-
gagement in immoral activity; and, (3) the loss of health and life among
persons in these categories is less costly than the loss of persons in classes
23. See Michael Waldholz, Astra Faces Fight Over Cost of AIDS Drug, WALL ST. J., January
21, 1992, at B1 (citing New York City pharmacies as the source for the following list of monthly
AIDS drug prices: Retrovir (AZI), $220-440; Videx (DDI), $220-320; Diflucan, $1,000; Pentam,
$160; Zovirax, $520; Cytovene, $1,100; Foscavir, $1,740).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See, eg., DANIEL M. Fox, AIDS and the American Health Polity: The History and Pros-
pects of a Crisis ofAuthority, in AIDS: THE BURDENS OF HISTORY 316 (Elizabeth Fee & Daniel M.
Fox eds., 1988) (suggesting that strong leadership in the form of a centrist coalition is vital to the
expedient handling of the AIDS crisis, and that such leadership, absent from federal sources, has
been supplied to some degree by local sources).
27. See, eg., ROBERT M. WACHTER, THE FRAGILE COALITION: SCIENTISTS, ACTIVISTS, AND
AIDS (1991) (discussing the fight over AIDS funding and other political AIDS issues during the
1989 International Conference on AIDS).
28. For a discussion of the marginalization and devaluation of high-risk groups, see Liz McMil-
len, Research Council's Report on AIDS Draws Fire for 'Insensitivity," CHRON. HIGHER ED., Feb. 24,
1993, at A9.
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less socially marginalized.2 9
These and other critics3° have also attacked corporations, particularly
private pharmaceutical companies engaged in AIDS and cancer research,
for what they consider unconscionable pricing of drugs approved by the
FDA for AIDS and cancer treatments under protection of federal patent
monopoly grants. 31 These critics argue that market incentives that en-
courage research and development expenditure, while desirable, do not
justify pricing so exorbitant as to deny access to potentially life-saving
drugs.3 2 In addition, they suggest that the ostensible need for incentives
may be exaggerated, given governmental subsidization of research and
development costs.
33
Activists have demanded the creation of public policies that promote
AIDS research without establishing unfettered monopoly power.34 For
example, the prices of some drugs are regulated in Great Britain, where
the cost of one month's supply of aerosol pentamidine, a drug for the
prevention of AIDS-related pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, was $26 in
1990, compared to the unregulated price of $150 in the United States.35
Supporters of current levels of governmental spending, as well as those
who prescribe a decrease in spending, emphasize that current budget
levels for AIDS research are more generous than amounts spent, per pa-
tient, to study other diseases.36 Some also assert that AIDS, unlike most
29. For discussion of various perspectives from the gay and lesbian communities regarding
AIDS policy, see Scott Harris, Gay Militancy-The Last Civil Rights Move?, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 11,
1991, at Al.
30. The pharmaceutical industry is under increasing pressure to curb spiraling prices of all
kinds of drugs, applicable to a wide variety of diseases other than AIDS. For a discussion of the
general public dissatisfaction with drug prices, see Joseph Weber, For Drugmakers, The Sky's No
Longer the Limit, Bus. Wx., Jan. 27, 1992, at 68.
3 1. See, e.g., Harvey F. Wachsman, Regulate the Drug Monopolies, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 16. 1993,
§ I, at 21 (observing pricing abuses under drug patent monopolies and suggesting regulatory action
to curb excesses).
32. See Brian O'Reilly, The Inside Story of the AIDS Drug, FORTUNE, Nov. 5, 1990, at 112,
116 (discussing the Wellcome pricing decisions regarding AZT in light of the notion that "govern-
ment research saved so much money that the high price of AZT was unwarranted.").
33. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
34. See Michael Parrish & Jane Applegate, Hope growsfor Generic AIDS Drug, L.A. TIMES,
May 30, 1991, at D1 (discussing efforts to expedite the availability of a generic form of AZT).
35. Christine Gorman, The Price Isn't Right" Drug Firms Start to Feel the Heat as the Cost of
Medication Spirals, TIME, Jan. 8, 1990, at 56.
36. For a discussion of competition for health spending dollars among various diseases, see
Robert Pear, AIDS Spending Debate, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 18, 1993, at C7. For a discussion of the cost
of AIDS in comparison with other diseases, see William A. Mundell & Jack Friedman, Financing to
Meet AIDS's True Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992, § 3, at 11.
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diseases, can be controlled by individual responsibility and altered behav-
ior. Therefore, they contend, AIDS research should have a lower prior-
ity than investigation of cancer or other illnesses perceived to have a
more tenuous behavioral nexus.3 7 Others have noted that limitations in
AIDS research budgets reflect the compromise that exists among the ten-
sions of competing areas of needs, particularly when the government is
seeking to balance the budget by reducing federal spending.38
Drug companies defend their pricing decisions as unavoidable, given
the high cost of finding, testing, and gaining FDA approval of new
drugs39 and the expenses related to doing business in a heavily regulated
industry.' ° The companies cite the economic view, incorporated in the
conferral of monopoly rights associated with patent grants, that heavy
private spending on research and development is generated by prospects
of large profits.4 Taken to its logical conclusion, this perspective sug-
gests that pressures to deny private corporations monopoly profits will
act as a disincentive to pursue research and ultimately impede progress in
finding preventative and curative treatments.42
37. See Michael Mason, AIDS, God and Uncle Sam: Don't Begrudge Money to Fight Deadly
Disease, ATL. CONsT., Nov. 25, 1991, at All (quoting then-President Bush as defending moderate
spending on AIDS because it "is a disease where you can control its spread by our [sic] own personal
behavior." Id. The article quotes an anonymous Louisiana woman, "It really burns me up that
[(gays')] own moral conduct brings AIDS on them, but they still get all that federal money. None of
these other diseases are self induced. The rest of us are being shortchanged."
38. SANDRA PANEM, THE AIDS BUREAUCRACY 81 (1988).
39. Milt Freudenheim, The Drug Makers' Defense on Costs, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1991, at D2.
40. These expenses are a function of the large number of legal concerns facing pharmaceutical
companies. For a detailed documentation of legal issues facing AIDS drug manufacturers, see Ali-
son Joy Arnold, Comment, Developing, Testing, and Marketing an AIDS Vaccine: Legal Concerns for
Manufacturers, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1077 (1991). Although the author focuses on legal issues within
the context of developing an AIDS vaccination, most of her observations are relevant to the develop-
ment of all AIDS treatments.
41. Id.
42. The regulatory climate of the American pharmaceutical industry in the 1960s and 1970s
was blamed by some for the erosion of competitiveness in world markets. See, e.g., Harold A.
Clymer, The Economic and Regulatory Climate: US. and Overseas Trends, in DRUG DEVELOP-
MENT AND MARKETING 137 (Robert B. Helms ed., 1975) (blaming regulation for an inability to
obtain reasonable returns on research and development investments).
Notwithstanding industry criticism of the ostensibly harmful effects of regulation on the profitabil-
ity of American firms, the pharmaceutical industry was the nation's most profitable industry be-
tween 1960 and 1990. See Brian O'Reilly, Drugmakers Under Attack, FORTUNE, July 29, 1991, at
48 (providing comparative profitability data for the period between 1960 and 1990).
This trend may be reversing in the 1990s. See Craig Torres & Michael Waldholz, Battered Drug
Stocks Dive; Bargain Hunters are Leery, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1993 at C1 (discussing the slump in
pharmaceutical stock prices which has resulted from Clinton administration criticism of the indus-
try's practices).
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Recently, drug companies have initiated research projects exploring
the economic effects of various treatments. The studies supply data re-
vealing the extent to which particular pharmaceutical treatments reduce
costs of untreated illness, thereby yielding a net economic benefit to con-
sumers.43 For example, Amgen has justified its cost of $1,000 per treat-
ment for the drug Neupogen by demonstrating potential savings of
$7,000 in avoided hospitalization costs.'
Pricing of drugs under monopoly status need not always provoke an-
tagonisms between corporate and activist interests. P. Roy Vagelos,
chairman of Merck & Company, suggests that drug companies engage in
responsible drug pricing by monitoring themselves to avoid levels of prof-
its that deny access to crucial drugs.4" Vagelos contends, "If the price is
too high and the patient cannot afford the medicine, we have not fulfilled
our reason for existence."46 This attitude, which reflects a vision of the
pharmaceutical industry as coupled with an obligation of public service,
may lead to voluntary resolution of the tension that often exists between
corporate and consumer interests.
Vagelos has recently recommended to the Clinton administration a
voluntary system of corporate responsibility, under which companies
would limit price increases to the rate of inflation.47 Under particularly
heavy public criticism during the early months of 1993, some pharma-
ceutical industry officials have even supported proposed regulations for
monitoring and enforcing nominally "voluntary" price controls.48 Yet,
managers at other drug companies have appeared angered by these pro-
posals and have suggested that they will not comply with any price con-
trol measures that remain truly voluntary.49
Given the recent history of heated conflict between private, govern-
mental and consumer groups over AIDS treatment, questions of corpo-
rate accountability must be addressed in the absence of pervasive
43. Joan O'C. Hamilton, Sure the Drug Works, But Is It Worth It?, Bus. WK., Aug. 26, 1991,
at 62. This kind of study is called "outcomes research." Id.
44. Id.
45. Merck's View on Prices, N.Y. TiMEs, May 24, 1991, at D3.
46. Id.
47. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Michael Waldholz, Harsh Medicine Prices, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16,
1993, at Al, A6.
48. Michael Waldholz, Drug Executives Yield Ground to White House, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10,
1993, at A3.
49. See supra note 47.
1993]
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corporate responsibility.5" A study of the normative questions that arise
regarding the pricing of drugs for AIDS treatment is a prerequisite to the
development of intelligent and effective public policy. Much has been
written about the FDA approval process of drugs5 and its effect on ac-
cess to AIDS treatment.52 No comprehensive analysis exists, however,
regarding the legal, economic and ethical issues concerning the pricing of
products once they become legally available to patients.53 The efficacy of
humane liberalization of drug access laws, in deference to individual
choice in the assessment of personal risks, is tempered to the extent that
50. With criticism of the pharmaceutical industry reaching a peak at the start of the Clinton
administration's new term, industry representatives who do not share Vagelos's conception of mis-
sion may still consider some concession strategically superior to resisting price concessions. Mitch
Daniels, an executive at Eli Lilly, labels this approach "pre-emptive surrender," and notes that it
may be the best industry stance in the current political climate. Rich Jaroslovsky, Washington Wire,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1993, at Al.
51. See, eg., George J. Annas, Faith (Healing), Hope and Charity at the FDA: The Politics of
AIDS Drug Trials, 34 VILL. L. REV. 771 (1989) (defending FDA requirement of rigorous standards
in AIDS drug testing); Marsha N. Cohen, Getting New Drugs to People With AIDS: A Public Policy
Response to Lansdale, 18 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 471 (1991) (observing that patient needs for ther-
apy should be considered in designing drug approval mechanisms, on public policy grounds rather
than Constitutional grounds); John Patrick DilIman, Note, Prescription Drug Approval and Terminal
Diseases: Desperate Times Require Desperate Measures, 44 VAND. L. REV. 925 (1991) (surveying and
comparing American and British drug approval systems, and critiqing the American system); Ill
Treatment, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1985, at 16 (discussing increased delays in FDA approval during
the mid 1980s); Susan Okie, AIDS Sufferers Buying Hope, WASH. PoST, Apr. 2, 1988, at A1, A6
(citing FDA commissioner Frank Young's sympathy with pressures to expedite the processes of
approving or making available experimental AIDS treatments).
In 1988, the FDA responded to mounting pressures to expedite the approval process for new
drugs by promulgating a regulation establishing a fast-track for the approval of drugs intended for
the treatment of diseases considered either severely debilitating or life-threatening. Investigational
New Drug, Antibiotic and Biological Drug Product Regulations: Procedures for Drugs Intended to
Treat Life-Threatening and Severely Debilitating Illnesses, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,516 (1988). For discus-
sion of the requirements and conditions of fast-track approval under the regulation, see Richard J.
Nelson, Note, Regulation of Investigational New Drugs: "Giant Step for the Sick and Dying"?, 77
GEO. L.J. 463, 473-475 (1988).
52. Pressures to expedite AIDS drug approvals led in 1987 to regulatory changes that liberal-
ized access to experimental treatments. See Title, 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(l)(i)-(iv) (1988) (allowing
treatment through the use of "investigational new drugs" during the clinical investigation stage to
those suffering from life-threatening disease as long as no comparable drug or therapy is available,
and the sponsor of the drug is seeking FDA marketing approval with due diligence).
53. For a good historical/legal analysis of policy issues related to drug pricing, including a brief
examination of pricing controls in other countries, see Mary T. Griffin, AIDS Drugs and the Pharma-
ceutical Industry: A Need for Reform, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 363 (1991).
While Griffin's work provides a detailed account of drug regulation in general and AIDS drug
regulation in particular, the approach is historical. My analysis departs from Griffin's approach by
examining normative policy questions from an ethical perspective.
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drug pricing places treatment beyond the reach of the intended benefi-
ciaries of reform.
This Article presents a comprehensive analysis of the policy considera-
tions regarding the pricing of new AIDS drugs. Part I discusses the two
countervailing interests that dominate the debate: the effect of patent mo-
nopoly policy on the speed and extent of research and development ini-
tiatives and the effect of monopoly pricing on drug accessibility. Part II
addresses legal, economic, and ethical concerns that are crucial to the
formulation of a sound drug pricing policy, including the principles of
monopoly theory, the relationship between monopoly and regulation, the
proper allocation of price concessions that reduce profits from normal
monopoly levels, and the determination of how much profit is necessary
to optimize research and development efforts. Part III examines a "ne-
gotiated drug pricing" proposal, aimed at creating and maintaining a
fair, effective, and efficient response to the AIDS crisis. Part IV contains
concluding remarks and suggests further areas of research and inquiry
helpful to the thoughtful resolution of the public policy challenges raised
herein.
I. PUBLIC POLICY, PATENTS, AND MONOPOLIES
A. Patent Law
Under U.S. patent law, an inventor who holds a patent is granted the
exclusive right to make, use and sell the invention for seventeen years.
54
One can only receive a patent for novel, 55 useful56 and nonobvious
57
inventions.
Patent monopoly rights represent an effort to balance largely incom-
patible incentives that can never be perfectly reconciled. 58 The prospec-
tive granting of a seventeen-year monopoly to a patent recipient, as
potentially extended under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984,59 encourages expensive research and develop-
54. Patent Act of 1952, as revised in 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
55. Id. at §§ 101, 102.
56. Id. at §§ 101, 112.
57. Id. at § 103.
58. For an exhaustive examination of patent policy and its effects on scientific progress, see
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use,
56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017 (1989); for a detailed discussion of public policy tradeoffs inherent in
different theoretical patent approaches, see Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent
Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REv. 305 (1992).
59. The normal patent life of seventeen years, conferred under the Patent Act, can potentially
19931
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ment.6° A pharmaceutical company can only justify the cost of ground-
breaking applied science when the expected value of profits resulting
from monopoly pricing power, including evaluation of all risks, exceeds
the hurdle rates established by the company for its new research
projects.61 Absent artificially inflated monopoly profits, incentives for in-
novation are dramatically reduced.62 Moreover, the monopoly granted
to a groundbreaker ideally allows for early diffusion of information by
virtue of the property protection it affords.
The monopoly granted for patented products must be robust in order
to provide an incentive to innovate-it must confer an inducement suffi-
cient to encourage the project under initially risky conditions. Yet, a
sphere of monopoly protection that is too strong can undermine the pol-
icy goals of patent law in several ways.
First, post-monopoly research aimed at refining and improving the
product or inventing similar products must also be encouraged. 63 This
activity has numerous potential beneficial effects, including increases in
be extended under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35
U.S.C.) [hereinafter Restoration Act]. The purpose of the Restoration Act is, inter alia, to en-
courage pharmaceutical research and development through the extension of drug patent terms in
compensation for time expended on FDA approval processes. H.R. REP. No. 857, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648. Extension periods are deter-
mined as a function of F.D.A. review time spent on assessing safety and effectiveness, as well as
approval of marketing plans. For discussion of the Restoration Act, see ALLEN M. Fox & ALAN
BENNETT, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM
RESTORATION ACT OF 1984 (1987); Susan Kopp Keyack, Note, The Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984: Is it a Healthy Long Term Solution?, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 147
(1989).
60. For discussion of patent policy and incentives to innovate, see Robert P. Merges, Commer-
cial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 805
(1988); A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 38
AM. U. L. REv. 1097 (1989).
61. For a thorough discussion of high-technology project selection, see BRIAN C. TWiSS, MAN-
AGING TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION at 119-147 (1974). Generally, capital intensive projects are
evaluated using some method of discounted cash flow analysis. For a good introduction to this
concept, see ALFRED RAPPAPORT, CREATING SHAREHOLDER VALUE: THE NEW STANDARD FOR
BUSINESS PERFORMANCE (1986).
62. Under this line of reasoning, drug patenting has traditionally been justified as a regulatory
necessity arising from market failure. See, eg., HENRY G. GRABOWSKI, DRUG REGULATION AND
INNOVATION: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND POLICY OPTIONS 11-14 (1976) (discussing the market
failure rationale for drug regulation).
63. For discussion of patent law and innovations that "design around" or improve existing
patents, see Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a
Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169 (1991).
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product quality and manufacturing efficiencies, as well as the inducement
of competition which should ideally act as a natural moderator of price.
Moreover, incentives to refine patented products should expedite the de-
velopment and improvement of those products. The tension between
groundbreaker, early-entrant monopoly interests and late entrant inter-
ests is unavoidable: the more inviolate and all-encompassing the sphere
of the groundbreaker's monopoly, the greater the groundbreaker's incen-
tive to engage in pioneering work, but the lesser the followers' incentive
for refinement. 64
Second, commentators argue that the protection of individual property
rights in the patent-granting process may inadvertently encourage a cul-
ture that eschews optimally efficient cooperative efforts. 65 Yet, the possi-
bility of joint-venture activity and contracts that establish prospective
shares in potential innovations suggests that impediments to cooperation
resulting from prospective monopoly grants are somewhat illusory.
While the patent process fosters a competitive environment in which lab-
oratories are involved in a race for discovery, 66 patenting does not fore-
close a wide scope of possible cooperative arrangements for the mutual
enhancement of advantage.
Still, as clusters of cooperating entities engage in isolated research, the
potential for inefficient duplication of effort increases.67 Moreover, po-
tential team discoveries may remain forever unrealized.68 Coordination
of AIDS research, aimed at the sharing of scientific information, is there-
fore important.69
Nevertheless, the benefits of centrally managed research programs
64. For an examination of the relationship between patents and market entry of close substi-
tutes, see Michael Waterson, The Economics of Product Patents, 80 AMER. ECON. REV. 860 (1990).
65. See Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Devel-
opment, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIV. 783, 788 (1987) ("Because technological advance
is often an interactive, cumulative process, strong protection of individual achievements may slow
the general advance.").
66. For a discussion of patent races, see Jennifer Reinganum, The Timing of Innovation: Re-
search, Development, and Diffusion, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 849 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
67. Levin et al., supra note 65, at 787-788.
68. The author refers here to a synergistic phenomenon familiar to all who have engaged in
collaborative efforts, wherein the contributions of two persons, of no value in isolation, provide a
solution to the puzzle when mixed in a collaborative process. Often the contributions of collaborator
B would not be triggered without an off-hand suggestion made by Collaborator A. Likewise, Collab-
orator A would not make the jump from her own suggestion to the contribution of Collaborator B in
isolation.
69. See Edward N. Brandt, Jr., Government Involvement and the Development of Public Policy
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may be incompatible with the open marketplace of scientific competition.
Incentives of both potential property rights and potential glory are cen-
tral to both academic and commercial research in the United States. At
some level, the contest to achieve these prizes must become competitive.
Implicit in the patent monopoly is a faith that the impetus to innovation
conferred by possible monopoly rents outweighs competitive inefficien-
cies, redundancies, and lost opportunities for synergy, especially given
the collaborative opportunities that remain within an essentially competi-
tive milieu.70
Third, the "winner-take-all" mentality of patent law, which denies any
return to late finishers, may serve to discourage some valuable research.
Companies assessing risks and predicting rewards are likely to abandon
potentially fruitful projects because the patent for a product recognizes
only the efforts of one technical inventor.71 Because patent law magnifies
the risks faced by smaller companies and late entrants,72 one group of
researchers has argued in favor of a system that awards multiple prizes.73
The one-winner approach of patent law may also indirectly discourage
cooperation, by reducing the incidence of overlapping or synergistic re-
search. As patent law directs laboratories to seek their own unique
ground and concomitant early-entrant advantages, the pool of potential
collaborators is likely to diminish.
Finally, a natural tension exists between monopoly pricing power,
which encourages the initial discovery or invention, and the actual diffu-
sion of both the technology and the product, which is the ultimate policy
goal behind the monopoly grant.74 While the prospect of inflated rents
in AIDS Research and Reporting, in AIDS AND PATIENT MANAGEMENT: LEGAL, ETHICAL AND
SOCIAL ISSuES 36, 40 (Michael D. Witt ed., 1986).
70. Because collaboration is bounded by the limitations of group dynamics and individual cog-
nitive confines, losses attributable to replication of efforts across labs and collaborative opportunity
costs may be inevitable. In a free marketplace and under the incentives created by patent law, the
best functionally sized entities may naturally develop, unavoidably replicating some efforts as a natu-
ral by-product of the competitive process.
71. For an examination of probability assessment in the race for new discoveries, see Steven A.
Lippman & Kevin F. McCardle, Preemption in R&D Races, 32 EURO. EcON. REV. 1661 (1988).
72. While size may be an advantage in the pursuit of a patent, management capabilities such as
research skills, development skills, and marketing quality may supersede size as a strategic variable.
For discussion of managerial considerations that may challenge the "bigger is better" view regarding
pharmaceutical development, see Management Focus: The Big Pill, EcONOMIST, Mar. 6, 1993, at 67.
73. Manfredi La Manna, et al., The Case for Permissive Patents, 33 EURO. EcON. REV. 1427
(1989).
74. This tension is part of a larger conflict: what is the appropriate allocation of available re-
sources between research and treatment? In 1986, approximately $542 million went to AIDS pre-
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should expedite research and development efforts, the assessment of
those rents during the seventeen-year duration of the patent impairs the
immediate distribution of and access to protected products. In the bal-
ance, impediments to the immediate distribution of new products are
usually outweighed by the very development of the product itself, which
may have been enabled solely by the granting of the patent. If the choice
is between invention followed by impaired distribution for several years
and no invention at all, the delay in diffusion that inevitably results from
monopoly pricing appears to be justified.
The model under which unlimited monopoly pricing potential is be-
lieved to induce optimal research and development is sound. There are
some potential drawbacks, such as negative efficiencies that may accom-
pany competitive as opposed to cooperative exploration. Yet, the effec-
tiveness and fairness of unbridled monopoly power are even more
substantially limited by another factor: the significant amount of public
subsidization which currently exists to encourage and support private
AIDS treatment research. Subpart I(B) examines the nature and degree
of federal and state spending on AIDS research and the manner in which
the existence of these subsidies erodes both the size of the corporate stake
in the ultimate product, and the motivational legitimacy of monopoly
expectations as an inducement for private research efforts.
B. The Orphan Drug Act
Private pharmaceutical companies that are involved in AIDS research
are the beneficiaries of direct federal funds as well as significant regula-
tory and tax benefits under the Orphan Drug Act (Act).75 The Act was
created to provide private pharmaceutical companies with incentives to
conduct research to find treatments for rare diseases and conditions.76
Congress was persuaded to pass the Act because the rarity of certain
diseases so limited the pool of potential consumers that even patent-con-
ferred monopoly rents would create insufficient research and develop-
ment incentives.77
vention activities and programs, with 43% of this figure going to AIDS research. That same year,
approximately $1 billion was spent on AIDS treatment. Jane E. Sisk, The Cost of AIDS: A Review of
the Estimates, 6 HEALTH AFF. 5 (Summer, 1987).
75. Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983).
76. Id. at 2049; see also H.R. REP. No. 840(I), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3577.
77. Id.
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To encourage research on treatment of rare diseases, the Act in its
most current form78 provides a tax credit equal to 50 percent of the cost
of clinical trials.79 In addition, the Act offers research and development
grants for clinical testing by independent researchers.80 The Act also
provides grantees exclusive marketing rights, for a period of seven years,
on certified new orphan drug applications.8 '
To qualify for these benefits, pharmaceutical companies must apply to
the FDA for Orphan Drug status. A drug with a target population of
less than 200,000 automatically qualifies for Orphan Drug status.8 2 In
addition, a drug may receive Orphan Drug protection if one can convince
the FDA that without Orphan Drug status the development of the drug
would be unprofitable, and thus infeasible.8 3 Automatic Orphan Drug
status, once granted, is not currently revocable in the event that the tar-
get population eventually exceeds 200,000.4 Pharmaceutical companies
developing drugs for the treatment of AIDS have received Orphan Drug
benefits for many of these products. As of August 31, 1991, half of the
drugs approved by the FDA for AIDS-related illnesses were designated
as Orphans. 5
Li-Hsien Rin-Laures and Diane Janofsky have argued persuasively
that the non-revocability of Orphan Drug status may work against the
original intent of the legislation. 6 Drugs that initially qualify as Or-
phans, particularly under the automatic "200,000 or less" clause, may
later become highly profitable for several reasons. Target populations
78. Since its inception in 1983, the Orphan Drug Act has been amended in 1984, 1985, and
1988. See Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-551, 98 Stat.
2817 (1984); Orphan Drug Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-91, 99 Stat. 387 (1985); Orphan
Drug Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-290, 102 Stat. 90 (1988). For a history of the Orphan
Drug Act, see Carolyn H. Ashbury, The Orphan Drug Act: The First Seven Years, 265 JAMA 893
(1991).
79. Orphan Drug Amendments of 1988, supra note 78.
80. Orphan Drug Amendments of 1988, supra note 78.
81. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a) (1988). The effect of this seven-year grant of market exclusivity for
qualifying new drug applications is to extend the normal monopoly protection granted under federal
patent law.
82. Pub. L. No. 98-551, 98 Stat. 2817 (1984).
83. Id.
84. An amendment was proposed in 1990 to alter this situation, so that market exclusivity
would end once an Orphan Drug's target exceeded 200,000. H.R. 4638, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136
CONG. REc. H5799 (daily ed. July 30, 1990). President Bush pocket vetoed the amendment.
85. OFFICE OF ORPHAN PRODUCTS DEVELOPMENT, ORPHAN DESIGNATIONS THROUGH AU-
GUST 31, 1991 (1991).
86. Li-Hsien Rin-Laures & Diane Janofsky, Note, Recent Developments Concerning the Orphan
Drug,4ct, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 269 (1991).
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may quickly exceed 200,000, dramatically increasing demand, and hence
profit potential.8 7 Indications for treatment through a particular drug
may expand over the course of its development, creating a surge or jolt in
demand. 8 Profits may also increase more than originally anticipated if
the market bears higher prices than initially predicted.8 9 Moreover, de-
mand may increase as a result of drug companies successfully and artifi-
cially squeezing their products into Orphan categories by "creating
artificial [target] subsets."'
Because the Act's market insulation continues to grant incentives to
develop drugs even after such incentives become unnecessary, efforts
were made during the 1991-92 congressional year to amend the Act.91
Among the changes proposed by the amendments was the application of
a "sales trigger." If Congress had passed the amendments, the trigger
would have worked as follows: If an Orphan Drug was on the market for
two years and sales exceeded $200 million, the FDA would approve mar-
keting of the drug by competitors, unless exceptionally high development
costs could be demonstrated.92 Under a "transition rule," Orphan Drugs
already on the market at the time of the amendments would be
grandfathered, such that the sales trigger would be applied only after five
years, instead of two years. 93 For those drugs the sales of which never
exceed $200 million, exclusive marketing rights would have been ex-
tended under the proposed amendments from seven to nine years.94 In
addition, awards of Orphan Drug status would have required a determi-
nation that, based on three-year projections, the patient population is un-
likely to exceed 200,000.95
The 1992 Amendments were defeated.96 Although the bill's sponsors,
Senators Kassebaum and Metzenbaum, intend to bring another proposal
before the 103rd Congress,97 the Act currently provides drug companies
with publicly subsidized windfall profits. Drugs for the treatment of
87. Id. at 280.
88. Id. at 282.
89. Id. at 282-283.
90. Id. at 288.
91. Orphan Drug Act Amendments of 1992, S. REP. No. 358, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
92. Id. at 22.
93. Id. at 3.
94. Id. at 21.
95. Id. at 21.
96. Reginald Rhein, Fiye Biotech Bills Signed into Law, New Congress Ponders Many More,
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Jan. 4, 1993, at 1.
97. Id.
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AIDS are prime candidates for Orphan Drug protection that extends be-
yond the Act's original and intended justifications. The number of
PWAs in the U.S. already exceeds 200,00098 and demand for treatment is
expected to continue to rise dramatically.99 Moreover, treatment indica-
tion for AZT expanded during the 1980s to include not only PWAs, but
also many asymptomatic people who are HIV-positive.10 This expanded
treatment indication creates precisely the kind of demand surge sug-
gested by Rin-Laures and Janofsky.10 Both PWAs and those who are
HIV-positive/asymptomatic are likely to spend significant amounts of
discretionary capital on encouraging treatments. The imperfections in
the Act's achievement of its mission suggest that drug companies may
receive more than adequate, government sponsored incentives to conduct
otherwise infeasible research." °2 In tandem, the Act and the Patent Act
underwrite risk and provide research subsidies, while conferring and
even extending proprietary rights to supernormal monopoly profits. In
effect, the public pays twice.103
Governmental subsidies to AIDS research affect the discussion of mo-
nopoly pricing in several ways. First, significant public underwriting of
research and development weakens corporate contentions that high
prices are necessary to recoup investments." 4 Second, public subsidies
98. See Jeffrey Schmalz, Gay Politics Goes Mainstream, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 11, 1992, § 6, at 18.
99. See supra notes 3, 6 and accompanying text.
100. Jean McCann, Giving AZT Early May Prevent Progression to AIDS, 134 DRUG Topics,
Aug. 6, 1990, No. 15, at 14.
101. See supra note 86.
102. For further discussion of and critique of the Orphan Drug Act, see John J. Flynn, The
Orphan Drug Act: An Unconstitutional Exercise of Patent Power, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 389 (1992)
(questioning the constitutionality of the Act); Patricia J. Kenney, The Orphan Drug Act-Is It a
Barrier to Innovation? Does It Create Unintended Windfalls?, 43 FooD DRUG COSM. L.J. 667
(1988) (answering "yes" to both title questions, and recommending fine tuning of the Act to improve
implementation of intended policies); Abbey S. Meyers, The Impact of Orphan Drug Regulation on
Patients and Availability, 47 FOOD & DRUG J. 9 (1992) (suggesting changes in FDA Orphan Drug
policy to improve the Act's value to patients); Cynthia A. Thomas, Re-Assessing the Orphan Drug
Act, 23 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 413 (1990) (supporting market exclusivity of Orphan Drugs in
general, but observing the need for Congress to modify administration of the Act to mitigate abuse).
103. See David Dahli, Drug Prices Rising Despite FederalAid, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 25,
1993, at Al (quoting Senator David Pryor, D-Ark., "Americans subsidize the development of medi-
cations, then they are forced to pay high prices for the drugs they already helped bring to market....
In essence, we have given the drug manufacturers a legally sanctioned license to price gouge the
American public.").
104. Thus, one commentator suggests that Wellcome's initial claim of the necessity to recoup
$80 million dollars in costs to develop AZT was grossly inflated. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 12, at
176-181.
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operate as an artificial inducement to enter into AIDS research, provid-
ing both financial incentives and governmental underwriting of risk.
Public sponsorship of AIDS research replaces some portion of the pat-
ent-conferred incentives that are necessary to encourage companies to
undertake privately financed research. Last, government spending on
AIDS treatment research justifies a view of resulting products as quasi-
public goods. °5 Because the public has a stake in AIDS research, the
unmitigated license of private companies to assess prices in a vacuum
cannot be justified. Through its subsidy, the public obtains both a say in
the pricing process and the right to some concessions of normal monop-
oly prices.
C. Are Monopoly Principles of Patent and Orphan Drug Policy
Inviolate?
The granting of a seventeen-year patent monopoly and extensions
under the Orphan Drug Act serves at least two functions: the encourage-
ment of research and development and the rewarding of successful inno-
vations that lead to marketable products and processes. 10 6  The
application of the force of law to grant artificially inflated profits provides
the super rewards necessary to justify expenditure on potential innova-
tions which, by their nature, are highly speculative. Because most
projects in search of new products and processes will ultimately fail, in-
cremental laboratory projects often can be rationalized only by the pros-
pect of supernormal profits.
The most basic of financial axioms is that great risk must be justified
by the potential for great reward. Yet, complete monopoly power for
patentable innovations does not affect all product-market segments iden-
tically. This is because a monopoly grant is a supply-side phenomenon,
which is affected differentially by levels of demand that can vary dramati-
cally. Consider, for example, a monopoly for a new kind of mouse trap.
Demand for the trap is moderate because the utility of superior pest con-
trol is of moderate importance to most people. People are willing to pay
somewhat more, but not much more, for a better mousetrap. Compare
this mousetrap with a hypothetical cure for AIDS. Demand for the lat-
ter product is enormous because most PWAs are willing, if necessary, to
devote virtually all existing assets to gaining access to the product. If
105. For detailed discussion of this contention, see infra notes 160-84 and accompanying text.
106. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (reviewing the purposes of
the federal patent system and stating that patent law "seeks to foster and reward innovation.").
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identical monopolies are awarded for both of these products, the mouse
trap will be moderately profitable, whereas the AIDS cure will be wildly
profitable.
Are these disparities in potential monopoly profitability justified by
differentiated demand among varying product-market segments? Those
defending supernormal profits for an AIDS cure would contend that fluc-
tuations in demand, and therefore in potential demand curves for prod-
uct innovations, efficiently allocate research and development efforts to
the most desired products. Companies will invest more in search of a
cure for AIDS than in search of a better mousetrap because potential
profit for the former innovation is greater than for the latter. The pros-
pect of heavily inflated profits based on magnitude of predicted demand
provides the impetus for increased and expedited spending among a
greater number of competitors, which should speed the process of finding
the desired product.
Notwithstanding the essential soundness of patent monopolies, princi-
ples of patent policy are not inviolate. They are a creation of public pol-
icy, an attempt to rectify a market failure that results in inadequate
incentives to innovate. Because patent monopolies are created as policy
and not a component of some natural economic law, they are somewhat
arbitrary and reflect only one of many possible choices available to ad-
dress a market imperfection. There is nothing sacrosanct about the sev-
enteen-year grant. Moreover, regulatory innovations may prove more
economically effective than the current system.
I emphasize the human creation of the existing system in order to ad-
dress more dispassionately the idea of "managed competition," the latest
rhetoric of the Clinton administration as it faces the challenge of provid-
ing health care to all while protecting legitimate private interests. 10 7
While the term "managed competition" seems peculiarly fashioned to
raise the hackles of all true believers in the free market, the patent mo-
nopoly system is already a human contrivance. In other words, the
granting of an exclusive marketing privilege under requisite circum-
stances is already a form of managed competition. Because it is a famil-
iar form, there is a misguided temptation to confer the system with
virtues of natural economic law. Accordingly, when we frame the best
solution to the public policy challenges regarding drug prices, it is impor-
107. See Hilary Stout & Rick Wartzman, White House Considers Taxes to Cover Health-Care
Costs of Up to $90 Billion, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 1993, at A3.
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tant to remember that managed competition is inevitable. The question,
then, becomes how best to manage competition.108
D. Politics, Emotions, and Statistics: The Need for Rational Analysis
Based on the Best Available Data
In industries that are either non-politicized or operating outside the
sphere of crisis, both current law and custom embrace the creation of
unfettered monopoly rights attendant to the granting of a patent. 109
These rights find their theoretical justification in the incentives they cre-
ate for the investment of time and money in risky and expensive research
and development. 110 When the patent is for a desirable but unnecessary
consumer product, the public tacitly supports the monopoly patent sys-
tem by declining to object. In other words, for most products and under
most circumstances, patent monopolies are not controversial. Because
demand for luxury products is a function of taste, consumer freedom
appears to remain relatively unimpaired by prices that can only rise so
far, given the normal elasticity of demand limitations that exist for non-
essential products. 1
In an atmosphere of tolerance toward monopoly patent pricing in the
abstract, outrage regarding monopoly pricing of patented AIDS drugs
results from the obvious difference between discretionary and essential
goods. Elasticity of demand for life-saving products is virtually non-exis-
tent, particularly under crisis conditions in which no alternatives or sub-
stitutes have been formulated. Society naturally desires reductions in
highly inflated prices of patented drugs which can extend life or dramati-
cally enhance quality of life. When prices are so prohibitive that access
to crucial treatments is denied, society has difficulty rationalizing death
and suffering on the basis of abstract economic concepts. The call arises
108. The policy recommendation in which this Article culminates-negotiated drug pricing-is
therefore not viewed as the regulation of a previously unregulated area. Rather, it is a change in the
nature of regulation, aimed at more accurately recognizing economic and ethical interests of all
parties concerned.
109. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
I 11. For example, consumers are unlikely to be outraged by substantially supernormal, unregu-
lated profits related to the patent on NutraSweet low-calorie sweetener. The ability of the patent
holder to exploit its monopoly is limited by the public's ability to abstain from purchasing the prod-
uct should the price become outrageous. While consumers may desire the product, they do not need
it. Manufacturers know that individuals curb the price they are willing to pay to indulge their
discretionary preferences and tastes.
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for either voluntary price concessions or mandatory governmental
regulation.
Nonetheless, regulation of AIDS drug pricing should be predicated
upon studies indicating the degree to which research and development
incentives are likely to be impaired. It is understood that investment
incentives are positively correlated with expected returns." 2 Indeed, de-
terioration of economic expectations is commonly viewed by economists
as a determinant of declining innovation.11 3 Still, the marginal utility of
each added dollar of expected return is likely to decline. If this is the
case, each incremental windfall profit dollar yields a research incentive of
decreasing significance. Price increments that become increasingly inef-
fectual at encouraging innovation for future use also impede the disper-
sion of the already existing drug. At some point, questionable or
insignificant gains in incentive are realized at a cost of access that society
will consider unjustifiable.
Because declines in marginal utility and drug access associated with
price increases will be gradual, the point at which the tradeoff between
incentives and access becomes unacceptable exists on a slippery slope.
The determination regarding the value of an increment of research incen-
tive versus the value of an additional immediate treatment is subjective.
It is impossible to quantifiably compare the value of an existing life with
the value a future life. Furthermore, the suggestion that sacrifice of cur-
rent treatment will expedite gains in innovation, resulting in a net saving
of lives, is undoubtedly speculative. Some would likely consider the idea
barbaric. Yet given all these limitations, it is necessary to determine the
point at which insignificant gains in research and development incentives
cannot justify additional monopoly price increases. 4 This determina-
tion should be made using the best available data under obviously imper-
fect conditions of speculation while regarding the elasticity of research
expenditure as a function of marginal gains in expected profit.
As groups representing PWAs seek access to vital treatments while
corporations seek maximization of profits for their shareholders, emo-
112. For this reason, weaknesses in patent policy have been shown under various circumstances
to impede innovation. See, ag., Elizabeth A. Hall, The Impact of a Weakened Patent Policy on
Development Incentives, 31 Q. REv. EcoN. & Bus. 79 (1991).
113. See, eg., Zvi Griliches, Patents: Recent Trends and Puzzles, in WORKING PAPERS ON ECO-
NOMIC AcTIvrrY: MICROECONOMIcs 291, 303 (Martin N. Baily and Clifford Winston eds., 1989).
114. The policy issues raised in this regard are normative issues of patent scope. For a detailed
discussion of the considerations and tradeoffs regarding patent scope policies, see Robert P. Merges
& Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
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tions can obfuscate the economic and ethical analysis of the most crucial
question: what policies are best suited to the most expedient saving of
lives and amelioration of sickness and suffering? The following discus-
sion is intended to address this question, taking into account both eco-
nomic realities and ethical obligations.
II. WHO SHOULD PAY FOR EXPENSIVE NEW DRUGS: AN ANALYSIS
OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES
In the best of worlds, all needs would be met. Under conditions of
scarcity, questions of resource allocation are invariably questions of nor-
mative philosophy and political economy. In an attempt to determine
sound policies that encourage optimization of access to those in need, it
is necessary to explore the nature of rights and duties in the provision of
basic human needs. This Part examines the question, Who should pay
for expensive new drugs, given finite resources?
A. Classical Rights and Duties Analysis
Under traditional rights and duties analysis, the creation of duties can
be justified only when: (1) the party to whom the suggested duty is owed
has a correlative right; and, (2) that right comprises an entitlement from
the particular party to whom the duty attaches.11" The creation of a
right on the part of terminally ill patients to receive treatment depends
upon and is shaped by the correlative duties that society imposes either
upon ourselves or others. AIDS patients can only obtain such a right if
the rights and duties equation is balanced by assessing the cost of the
entitlement to a paying entity.
Some may argue that the rendering of any potential rights as contin-
gent on the location of a justifiable duty-holder degrades the nature of
rights. If a right is viewed as inalienable, natural, or God-given, then
that right is protected by virtue of its sanctification and is thus funda-
mental. Under this view, an inalienable right is sufficient in itself to es-
tablish correlative duties to meet the needs it creates. Thus, Alan
Gewirth notes, "burdens are for the sake of benefits, and not vice
115. For a discussion of the relationship between rights and duties from which this statement is
derived, see Joel Feinberg, Duties, Rights, and Claims, 3 AMER. PHIL. Q. 137 (1966) (defining a
right as the "justified entitlement to something from someone"). For discussion of the correlativity
of rights and duties in general, see Marcus G. Singer, The Basis of Rights and Duties, 23 PHIL. STUD.
48 (1972); David Lyons, Rights Claimants and Beneficiaries, 6 AMER. PHIL. Q. 173 (1969).
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versa."1 16 As a result, "Respondents have correlative obligations be-
cause subjects have certain rights."'1 17 If rights create duties, and not
vice versa, then balancing the rights-duties equation involves finding
places to locate the burdens created by duties and assessing related costs
at those sites.
I respond to those who recommend the assessment of duties sufficient
to meet the demands of rights as follows: It is true that the conception of
a fundamental right is intolerably denigrated if the very existence of the
right becomes dependent on the previous and overriding discovery of
driving duties. To state that a right is truly inalienable, as all rights are
lest they become mere desires or goals, is to stipulate its preeminence in
determining how to flesh out the rights-duties equation. While I concede
that true rights are the source of duties and not vice versa, this conces-
sion must require a conservative circumscription of the sphere in which
rights are identified.
Specifically, true rights, which create duties under Gewirth's reason-
ing, should be limited to what philosophers label "negative rights," or
rights to be left alone."' The "rights" which philosophers call "positive
rights" are those that require positive action rather than omission. 19 Be-
cause "positive rights" call on the limited resources of a potential cadre
of duty holders, they are more complex and controversial than negative
rights. What some philosophers call positive rights, such as the right to
receive treatment regardless of ability to pay, are not actually rights, but
rather hopes and expectations that are contingent upon the charity of
those who have the resources to pay. 120 Those maintaining these hopes
and expectations wish to be beneficiaries of charitable compassion felt by
a donor. Thus, John Kleinig observes, "Where people do love and care
for each other, there is no need for rights-talk, since what is due to the
other will be encompassed within the loving or caring relationship."''
116. Alan Gewirth, Why Rights Are Indispensable, 95 MIND 329, 333 (1986).
117. Id.
118. For a more elaborate discussion distinguishing negative and positive rights, see MAURICE
W. CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? (1973).
119. Id.
120. For the argument against this statement, see Gewirth, supra note 116, at 341. Gewirth
argues that provision of basic human sustenance, such as food or other life-preserving care, is not
merely charity. Accordingly, because the right drives the duty, "assurance of the fulfillment of [the]
right requires governmental provision."
121. John Kleinig, Human Rights, LegalRights and Social Change, in HUMAN RIGHTS 46 (Eu-
gene Kamenka & Alice Ehr-soon Tay eds. 1978). It seems ironic that Kleinig discusses what is
"due" to another in the process of supplanting adversarial rights analysis with love and care.
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While true rights, i.e., negative rights, are the compelling force behind
mandatory duties, precatory moral action is the precursor to charitable
donation.
At least three possible types of correlative duties122 exist to meet the
obligations created in fashioning a right: (1) not depriving another; (2)
assisting to protect another from deprivation; and, (3) helping one who is
deprived.1 23 A duty to subsidize AIDS drug treatments to make them
more affordable comprises the third variety of duty, a duty to help
others. Duties to provide assistance to those in need can be justified
under respectable tenets of normative philosophy,124 but such duties are
limited in nature.
Immanuel Kant suggests that defendable duties arise under a categori-
cal imperative, such that the duty can be made universal, respects indi-
viduals as ends rather than means, and respects human autonomy.
1 25
Richard DeGeorge believes that the duty to assist those in need meets
Kant's standards. However, DeGeorge also believes that this duty is lim-
ited or imperfect because it is directed to all the world and limited by
society's ability to meet many such needs with finite resources. 126 Imper-
fect duties are bounded by conditions of fairness and affordability, such
that "the obligations or burdens imposed by a right must be affordable in
relation to resources, other obligations, and fairness in distribution of
burdens."' 27 Society's determination of who should subsidize drug com-
pany concessions of normal monopoly profits must consider the validity
and scope of a fair duty, as well as a recognition that competing needs for
assistance may circumscribe the degree of subsidization.
Clearly, few people in a capitalist society truly believe that all unmet
needs have a right to be met, such that the needs should exhaust all dis-
cretionary expenditure by property holders in their own behalf.' 28 One
122. Edwin M. Hartman, for example, has argued in favor of a fourth possible type of correlative
duty, which he calls "avoiding helping to deprive." Edwin M. Hartman, Donaldson on Rights and
Corporate Obligations, in BUSINESS ETHICS: THE STATE OF THE ART 163, 165 (R. Edward Freeman
ed., 1991).
123. HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS 20 (1980).
124. For a discussion of the duty to help others, see Peter Singer, The Obligation to Help, in
RALPH W. CLARK, INTRODUCTION TO MORAL REASONING 100 (1986).
125. For detailed discussion of these tenets, see IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE MET-
APHYSICS OF MORALS (Robert Paul Wolff ed., Lewis W. Beck Trans., 1969).
126. RICHARD J. DE GEORGE, BUSINESS ETHICS 75 (3d ed. 1990).
127. Thomas J. Donaldson, Rights in a Global Market, in BUSINESS ETHICS: THE STATE OF
THE ART 139, 149 (R. Edward Freeman, ed., 1991).
128. To the contrary, the idea that the needs of all must be met before the wants of others can be
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also hopes that few persons in capitalist society feel no desire to meet
some level of need experienced by those less fortunate than themselves.
This desire to aid, highly individualized and personal, has traditionally
formed the realm of charity. Charity is a word that has become some-
what pejorative in connotation in recent years, but which perhaps has
been given short shrift in the process. Because those in need comprise a
seemingly insatiable source of demand, which greatly exceeds society's
limited ability and willingness to meet that demand, need alone cannot
create rights. Rather, it depends upon the generosity of those whose
compelling sense of charity ensures that the demand is not entirely un-
met. 129 The reality then is this: PWAs seeking subsidization13  of drug
costs, like all others in need of outside help, can and will receive that
subsidization to an extent defined by the sense of altruism experienced by
such entities as private donors, government, and corporate benefactors,
potentially including pharmaceutical companies.
B. Theories in Support of Corporate Pricing Concessions
Society recognizes a duty to provide health care under limited circum-
stances. Programs that provide subsidization of medical care in the
United States exist, but they are generally linked to age, income, and
employment status rather than residence and need.1 ' Richard E. Mer-
ritt summarizes the American approach to health care financing as three-
dimensional: health care is "a fringe benefit for most of the employed...,
an entitlement conditioned by categorical eligibility for many, e.g., Medi-
caid and Medicare..., and it is a matter of chance and charity for all the
rest." 1
32
One can make compelling arguments in favor of recognizing a right to
met is clearly Marxist rather than Capitalist in nature. See generally Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels,
The German Ideology, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 146 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 1972).
129. For discussion of the nature of charity as opposed to regulatory public support by edict, see
Laura Brown Chisolm & Dennis R. Young, Symposium Introduction: What is Charity? Implications
for Law and Policy, 39 CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 653 (1989).
130. As the Article argues later, PWAs in the present system of government-supported research
and development are not actually seeking subsidization of drug costs. Because tax dollars go toward
the development of new pharmaceutical products, consumers and other citizens have an investment
in these products, such that reductions in price may represent return on investment rather than
private corporate subsidization. See infra notes 174-84 and accompanying text.
131. Daniel M. Fox & Emily H. Thomas, The Cost of AIDS: Exaggeration, Entitlement, And
Economics, in AIDS AND THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 197, 205 (Lawrence 0. Gostin ed., 1990).
132. Richard E. Merritt, Focusing on State Roles in Financing Options, in AIDS AND LONG-
TERM CARE 115 (Donna L. Infeld and Richard McK.F. Southby eds., 1989).
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publicly subsidized health care, either for all or for those who cannot
afford to pay for it themselves. 133 These include the value of a compas-
sionate society, the notion of public health as a public good, and the need
to spread responsibility for charitable subscription equitably across soci-
ety in order to avert moral free ridership.
A right to treatment that arises from the idea of a compassionate soci-
ety is necessarily a limited or circumscribed right. This right is restricted
by the claims of other rights that may arise from competing needs and
make demands on limited resources. From this standpoint, the right
may be defined as encompassing a reasonable amount of financial sup-
port. The slippery concept of reasonableness is defined by balancing the
many needs for compassion in light of the scarcity of available funds. 134
Existence of a right to receive care is dependent, of course, on the recog-
nition of a correlative duty for society to make reasonable provision for
the unmet needs of those in exigency or poverty. Recognition of such
rights and duties is extremely controversial. 135 The rights at issue in this
Article are best justified by virtue theories of ethics and feminist ethics of
care.
136
Virtue theories extend at least as far back as Aristotle,t 37 who en-
couraged the development of traits considered good unto themselves,
apart from the analysis of rights and duties. Among the virtues com-
monly recognized in Judeo-Christian cultures are selflessness, mercy and
compassion. These attributes are virtuous precisely because they extend
beyond the classically recognized negative rights and corresponding
duties. 138
133. In the case of expensive new drug treatments for AIDS, the public subsidy could help all
recipients by a profit underwriting grant to the proprietor, reducing the market price charged to all.
The subsidy could also be granted to purchasers on the basis of proven need, thereby focusing subsi-
dization on persons who cannot afford to pay monopoly rents themselves.
134. In other words, random generosity should be tempered with distributive justice. See Leo-
nard M. Fleck, Just Health Care Rationing: A Democratic Decision-Making Approach, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1597, 1598 (1992) (recognizing the opportunity costs associated with donations to meet one
human need rather than to a competing need, and observing, "Generosity is morally praiseworthy
only if the more basic demands of health care justice have been satisfied.").
135. See infra notes 148-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of libertarian criticism.
136. The ethics of care has been labelled "feminist" as well as "feminine." Susan Sherwin sug-
gests caring is a direct component of feminine ethics, which can also contribute to a feminist ethics,
which is directly concerned with questions of oppression. SUSAN SHERWIN, No LONGER PATIENT:
FEMINIST ETHICS AND HEALTH CARE 49 (1992).
137. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. I.4, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1745
(Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) (original publication date).
138. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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1. Ethics of Care
An ethics of care suggests that purportedly rational goals of freedom,
autonomy and the recognition of related rights 39 are inadequate norma-
tive targets under conditions of inequality." Carol Gilligan notes,
The experiences of inequality and interconnection, inherent in the relation-
ship of parent and child,.. . give rise to the ethics of justice and care, the
ideals of human relationship---the vision that self and other will be treated
as of equal worth, that despite differences in power, things will be fair; the
vision that everyone will be responded to and included, that no one will be
left alone and hurt. 14 1
From one feminist perspective, the activity of "doing for others" has
been assigned and segregated to women, and therefore largely omitted
from conceptions of human nature that undergird much philosophical
and economic theory.1 42 As a result, contractarian models of ethics are
built on an understanding of humans as self-seeking and competitive'43
and only likely to provide social good inadvertently when allowed to pur-
sue self-interest freely. Annette Baler observes that selfless human be-
havior, particularly among parents and health professionals, arises from
a recognition of responsibility in relationships characterized by depen-
dency and inequality."4 Nel Noddings suggests that the realm of ethics
should concern caring rather than abstract ideas of justice.' 45
An ethics of care may provide intellectual footing for an intuitive sense
that society is morally bound to shift resources away from discretionary,
luxury spending toward health care for the very sick and the dying.' 46
139. For a discussion of the relationship between feminist jurisprudence and rights, see Deborah
L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617 (1990).
140. The ethics of care has developed out of "relational" feminism, which acknowledges differ-
ences between men and women, and extols undervalued, relationship-oriented, humanistic attributes
often associated with women. For a discussion of the development of ethics of care from relational
feminism, see Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989).
141. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE. PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT 62-63 (1982).
142. JEAN BAKER MILLER, TOWARD A NEw PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 70 (2d ed. 1986).
143. Id.
144. See generally ANNETTE BALER, POSTURES OF THE MIND (1985).
145. See generally NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL
EDUCATION (1984).
146. This moral obligation can be conceived as either a duty to subsidize individual categories of
need, or more broadly as a social obligation to provide adequate health care to all persons as a public
service. For a discussion of the argument against privately financed health care and in favor of equal
distribution of medical care, see generally THEODORE R. MARMOR & JON B. CHRISTIANSEN,
HEALTH CARE POLICY: A POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH (1982).
[Vol. 71:691
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/5
DRUG PRICING
More broadly conceived, universal health care through compulsory sick-
ness insurance is institutionalized in a number of countries, including
Germany, Austria, Norway, Britain, and the Netherlands. These health
care programs reflect the recognition of a duty to provide basic treatment
to all.147 Whether conceived as a specific duty to provide subsidies to the
sick and dying, or as a broader duty to provide governmentally sup-
ported health care for all, the ostensible obligation encompasses the tax-
base subsidization of expensive new drug treatments for AIDS.
While an ethics of care is an important impetus to private generosity, it
cannot stand on its own merits against classical rights and duties criti-
cism. Libertarian theory, for example, disfavors imposing a public duty
to subsidize expensive pharmaceutical treatment. Libertarian arguments
generally focus on the relationship between individual freedom from co-
ercion and private property rights and the distinction between public use
and private interest.
Robert Nozick's theory of entitlement suggests property is justly held
only if the acquisition and transfer of that property are just. 148 Entitle-
ment in acquisition is derived from making a product or mixing one's
labor with an object. 4 9 Transfer of a justly acquired product is legiti-
mate only if voluntary.'10 Involuntary redistribution of property is not
justified, because it coercively violates individual and authentic property
entitlement. '5'
Charles L. Schultze likewise criticizes "the public use of private inter-
est."" 2 Schultze observes that "the collective-coercion component of in-
tervention should be treated as a scarce resource." 153 He suggests that
social intervention that expropriates private interests for the public good
should be substantially curtailed in order to preserve economic efficiency
and individual choice.' 54 Milton Friedman takes the argument to its log-
ical conclusion by stating that the appropriation of government funds for
charitable purposes should be constrained, so that individual freedoms
are preserved in making ethical decisions and choosing which public
147. DENNIS J. PALUMBO, PUBLIC POLICY IN AMERICA 179 (1988).
148. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 149-54 (1974).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST (1977).
153. Id. at 6.
154. Id. at 6-7.
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needs, if any, to subsidize."' 5
How, if at all, can one reconcile feminist ethical theory with the classi-
cal liberal foundations of capitalist society? When the ethics of care
collide with the interests of private property and autonomy, it is appro-
priate that the former should be subsumed within the latter. Several con-
siderations suggest that freedom and autonomy are, and should be,
dominant values over care.
Most importantly, reasonable minds differ considerably in the particu-
lar behaviors that constitute care. Because individuals have varying no-
tions regarding the nature of the commonwealth, ideas of care would
diverge even if unlimited resources existed. Given the reality of severely
limited funds, there is no single, unassailable definition of the most caring
policies.
Because consensus on the nature of the "public interest" in a pluralis-
tic society cannot exist, governmental spending in the name of "caring"
must ultimately force dissenters to fund causes not preeminent among
their own personal priorities.156 Milton Friedman's call for minimal reg-
ulation focuses on the decentralization of, rather than the annihilation of,
modes of caring. 15 7 Minimizing compulsory subsidization of an official
version of the "public interest"'158 preserves discretionary funds for each
individual's charitable vote. Freedom to choose the causes one supports
is not inherently incompatible with caring, which in fact is an individual,
emotional phenomenon that can and should be left to personal choice.
Perhaps most importantly, caring thrives best within a free society in
which the responsibility for caring is not bureaucratized, politicized, and
thereby sanitized beyond ordinary human contact. Yet the converse is
not true-freedom is not preserved by compulsory caring and centralized
determination of the nature of compassion and the public welfare.
155. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7-21 (1982).
156. Thus, one commentator has observed that arbitrary, trivial or authoritarian regulation will
tend to be perceived as bureaucratic imperialism and may encourage disrespect for the law. See
George A. Steiner, New Patterns in Government Regulation of Business, in BUSINESS ETHICS 518,
522-23 (W. Michael Hoffman & Jennifer Mills Moore eds., 2d ed. 1990).
157. See supra note 155.
158. The "official version" of the public interest represented by many forms of regulation is often
discussed in terms of paternalism. See, eg., Steven Kelman, Regulation and Paternalism, in RIGHTS
AND REGULATIONS 241 (M. Bruce Johnson & Tibor R. Machan eds., 1983).
For a discussion of the difficulties associated with determining what is the substance of the public
interest, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 155, at 133-136.
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Rather, each effort to institutionalize care further erodes the values of
autonomy and freedom.
Thus, while there is room for an ethics of care within a free society,
there is no place for freedom in a society that coerces a particular polit-
ical doctrine of care. Laws that preserve our individual autonomy also
maintain our potential to follow the ethical voices that lead us to care in
differing ways. Maximization of individual freedom preserves the funda-
mental right of all persons to pursue their own ethics of care, free from
the coercive, governmental version of right and wrong. Because mean-
ingful ethics are derived from personal thought, investigation and discov-
ery, the most legitimate ethics of care are those that focus moral
decision-making on the individual.159 It is both possible and desirable to
promote the social welfare by allowing individuals to consider and assess
privately their responsibility to care for others.
2. New Drugs as a "Quasi-Public Good"
I have argued that an ethics of care cannot legitimately be institution-
alized through governmental action without serious degradation of fun-
damental personal rights. Any regulatory initiative to subsidize
consumer purchases of new AIDS drugs must rely, if at all, on a determi-
nation that effective, universally accessible AIDS treatment is a public
good supported by tax dollars. A good is generally considered public if:
(1) no individual's consumption of the good diminishes its consumption
by others; and, (2) a private-market pricing system cannot be used to
assess fees according to individual usage. 16° Because of these attributes,
public goods are not readily adaptable to the private market. It is there-
fore appropriate for the government to finance necessary public goods for
the welfare of all.
Is public health, including the application of expensive pharmaceutical
treatments, a public good? Certainly it is not, in the pure, classical sense
derived from the definition above. Drug treatment is finite and divisible,
so that the consumption by one individual diminishes the pool of goods.
For many years, private market pricing has charged individuals sepa-
rately for their usage of pharmaceutical products.
Classical, exemplary varieties of public goods, such as military protec-
159. For greater elaboration of the idea that ethics should be personal and not compulsory, see
Steven R. Salbu, Law and Conformity, Ethics and Conflict: The Trouble With Law-Based Concep-
tions of Ethics, 68 IND. L.J. 101 (1992).
160. EDWIN MANSFIELD & NARIMAN BEHRAVESH, ECONOMICS U.S.A. 512 (1986).
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tion, must be indivisible in order to be removed from the private mar-
ket. 161 National defense redounds equally to the benefit of all162 and is
distributed as a whole rather than allocated in different portions to differ-
ent consumers. Pharmaceutical treatment is finite and directed selec-
tively in differing portions to individual consumers. In this sense, it is
not a classical public good and not immune from incorporation into the
private market mechanism.
Yet, several factors regarding AIDS treatment may recommend
against facile classification efforts. Perhaps most significantly, numerous
goods are treated in the United States as public or quasi-public goods,
notwithstanding their divisibility or partial divisibility among benefi-
ciaries. Services such as public education are certainly not entirely indi-
visible, but rather confer both private and public benefit: the individual
educated at public expense receives a benefit that is individually appro-
priable in a capitalist society and, at the same time, a part of the larger
work force infrastructure that is essential to social and economic pros-
perity.1 63 These "quasi-public goods" are not the purest examples of the
need for government to participate in a vacuum left by private market
failures. Still, the largely indivisible public welfare component of institu-
tions like education is sufficiently compelling to require substantial public
support.
Health care is in many ways like education and thus qualifies as a
quasi-public good in the United States. Like education, medical care
confers both private and public benefit: the individual who receives the
treatment is personally assisted, while the work force and consumer base
are kept able-bodied and productive. For this reason, while health care is
not a classical public good, it is viewed as a vital part of our social and
economic infrastructure and our tax dollars, therefore, support it.
As a quasi-public good, health care is precariously balanced between
two competing and irreconcilable considerations. On the one hand, soci-
ety is reluctant to coerce individuals to underwrite causes which they
161. Id.
162. This is true despite the controversy that often surrounds the degree to which any particular
act of war is considered beneficial or detrimental. National defense is a public good because of its
universal application, notwithstanding disagreements regarding how good the good actually is.
163. The example of public school education reveals the complexity of the public goods/private
goods distinction. In particular, the movement to provide individual choice regarding personal con-
sumption of educational services suggests that market mechanisms will be utilized more frequently
in the future to allocate public goods. For discussion of this trend, see JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M.
MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990).
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may not personally support.1 Yet, if a substantial majority of society
does support the public financing of health care under certain circum-
stances,1 65 implementation of such a policy may only be possible via a
centralized, compulsory process. This need for a uniform policy to exe-
cute the public will arises from the problem of moral free ridership. In
essence, individuals cannot effectively vote their support for subsidized
health care solely through charitable subscription. One person's volun-
tary donation reflects that individual's acceptance of a widely recognized
duty to provide care to all in need, while others who choose not to pro-
vide charitable support gain a moral free ride.166 Of course, much real
need will remain unmet under voluntary, noncoercive systems because
many members of society will decline to devote their own dollars to the
cause. Even those of the best faith may withdraw their support and re-
fuse to carry a disproportionate share of the load that is widely believed
to be the responsibility of all.167 As a result of the free ridership problem,
good-faith efforts to preserve individual freedoms may result in the gross
underfunding of products and services uniformly considered to deserve
much more significant attention. The only way to assure that these
projects receive appropriate recognition is to compel all taxpayers to sup-
port them, removing the phenomenon of attrition associated with incen-
tives to ride free in a system of voluntary support.
As noted earlier, free ridership and the associated underfunding of vi-
tal projects come at the inevitable cost of coercion. It is thus essential
164. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
165. This is probably a reasonable assumption. See Hilary Stout, Seeking a Cure, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 12, 1993, at Al (discussing a Wall Street Journal/NBC News Poll, according to which "78%
of the public believe that the current health-care system doesn't meet the needs of most Americans,"
and "66% say they would be willing to pay higher taxes so that everyone could get health
insurance.").
166. But see supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text (positing libertarian arguments of dis-
tributive justice, which suggest that what this Article labels "moral free ridership" may in fact be
moral coercion). In reality, moral free ridership and moral coercion are flip sides of the same coin.
Moral free ridership is the risk attendant to choosing completely free markets, while moral coercion
is the risk that accompanies a denial of compulsory subsidization of public welfare benefits which a
substantial majority of citizens believe should be provided to all.
167. Even classically liberal economist Milton Friedman is sympathetic to this line of reasoning.
He suggests that "we cannot rule out the possibility that... charitable activities will be inadequate, if
only because of the neighborhood effect involved in the fact that I benefit if another man contributes
to the care of the insane." FRIEDMAN, supra note 155, at 33. Although Friedman is speaking of free
ridership related to a recognized duty to care for the insane, his observation applies as well to free
ridership problems associated with health care provision, assuming society recognizes the relevant
duty.
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that funding gains are balanced against this consideration, particularly
by determining the degree of social consensus in support of the public
subsidy. If the public unanimously supports the funding, the level of
coercion approaches zero while the amelioration of free ridership is sig-
nificant. On the other hand, if there is a narrow majority of support for
the public subsidy, coercion is great and amelioration of free ridership is
reduced. In this latter scenario, dissenters would argue that they are not
receiving a free ride at all because the "ride" leads to a destination they
have no desire to reach. Accordingly, compulsion to support a quasi-
public good, justified on the basis of averting moral free ridership, must
be based upon reliable data indicating widely held public support of the
beneficial use of public funds.
A substantial majority of the American public supports the idea of
increased access to health care through some level of tax subsidization.1 68
In the area of AIDS research and treatment, this consensus has been
recognized in the form of substantial governmental spending. Both pub-
lic and private medical researchers are beneficiaries of significant
amounts of NIH subsidy, estimated by Bruce Nussbaum to equal $9 bil-
lion for 1991 alone.1 69 Ten percent of this expenditure currently goes to
AIDS research.170 President Clinton's most recent proposals recom-
mend increases in governmental spending on AIDS, including an addi-
tional $8.2 billion for prevention, immunization, and women's health
research.171 This public spending reflects, implicitly, a degree of political
consensus that Americans have an aggregate public duty to allocate tax
dollars to AIDS research and care. This spending also indicates that
such care is considered a public or quasi-public good, deserving of public
subsidy and otherwise susceptible to moral free ridership.
I have attempted to persuade readers to take care against recklessly
recognizing rights without due consideration of the entire rights-duties
equation.172 I have also suggested that subsidization of AIDS drugs is
justified under a quasi-public goods theory.173 Even those who question
the legitimacy of the quasi-public goods rationale must recognize the
168. See supra note 165.
169. NUSSBAUM, supra note 12, at 330.
170. Dick T. Washington, Your Money or Their Lives: Patient Advocates Are Learning from
AIDS Activists How to Work the System, TIME, Oct. 12, 1992, at 66.
171. Hilary Stout, Clinton's Economic Package: Health Care Goals Take a Back Seat to Driving
Down the Deficit for Now, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 1993, at A10.
172. See supra notes 115-30 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 71:691
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/5
DRUG PRICING
public's proprietary stake in the products that arise from such publicly
funded research as currently exists, as long as the support of tax dollars
remains. While critics may choose to challenge the appropriateness of
any funding, the reality of funding under current policy should confer
upon the public, including potential consumers, a voice in questions such
as pricing, which is currently relegated under patent law to unilateral
corporate determination.
Some may also argue that much governmental spending on research
and development consists of grants to public rather than private institu-
tions and that this diminishes the magnitude of actual private appropria-
tion of quasi-public goods. Yet, while much governmental funding goes
to basic research or university research ostensibly "not-for-profit," pri-
vate patent holders are currently able to appropriate individual benefit
from this source.' 74 Upon receipt of their patents, patent holders get a
subsidized ride consisting of the public research groundwork on which
they build their own research.175 This benefit does not account, of
course, for the more direct governmental support the pharmaceutical
companies themselves receive in order to help finance their own research
efforts.
For example, the National Institutes of Health have spent $30 million
dollars to develop the cancer drug Taxol.176 In 1991, Bristol-Myers re-
ceived government research findings as well as exclusive rights to Taxol
in order to expedite its public dispersion. 177 Exploiting its monopoly ad-
vantage, Bristol-Myers charges $6,000 for four months of treatment. 178
As one critic observes, " 'cancer patients already have financed the inven-
174. For a discussion of the reciprocity of academic and industrial laboratory research, see
DAVID SCHWARTZMAN, THE EXPECTED RETURN FROM PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH: SOURCES
OF NEW DRUGS AND THE PROFITABILITY OF R&D INVESTMENT 15-19 (1975) (discussing the in-
teraction and cross-exploitation of information between the public and private research and develop-
ment sectors).
175. The concept of information as a valuable asset that can be appropriated at no charge is
often cited as a crucial market failure necessitating incentives such as patent monopolies in order to
encourage research and development. See, eg., Richard E. Romano, Aspects of R&D Subsidization,
1989 Q.J. ECON. 863 (observing that "the market fails to provide the socially optimal level of R&D
expenditure because of the public properties of information.").
This Article suggests that the appropriability of information, which requires patent protection as
an incentive to innovation, also provides private industry with windfall contributions to investment,
as they receive free rides on publicly funded research, yet are able under patent law to appropriate all
profits for themselves.
176. John Carey, How Many Times Must a Patient Pay?, Bus. WK., Feb. 1, 1993, at 30.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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tion of Taxol once as taxpayers.... Why should they be forced to pay
Bristol-Myers a second time as consumers?' "179
This example may be extreme, perhaps reflecting an inordinate
amount of governmental spending. Even so, the company cannot be ex-
pected to market a product for free, or at a loss, simply because the
government incurred development costs. Still, criticism of Taxol's mar-
keting history highlights a valid principle: Patent-related monopoly au-
thorization should be tempered and limited to the extent that taxpayer
dollars have conferred a public property interest in the relevant product.
In the case of Taxol, Bristol-Myers is justified in seeking a reasonable
profit in return for its marketing efforts. Yet, because much of the finan-
cial risk associated with preliminary research and development was
borne by the public, Bristol-Myers' appropriation of extraordinary gains
cannot be explained by the usual "incentives" rationale for conferring
patent monopolies. 180 The company has not incurred all of the risky de-
velopment expenses that, admittedly, need and deserve to be highly re-
warded. Moreover, because much of the research expenditure was public
rather than private, a monopoly grant was not a necessary incentive upon
which private efforts are typically considered to be conditioned. Because
it is estimated that as many as one half of the promising AIDS drugs are
developed in government or university laboratories,18 1 the issues raised
by Taxol are very much applicable to the public policy questions related
to the pricing of new AIDS treatments.
The reality of government spending on both public and private medi-
cal research, as a component of our view of health care as a quasi-public
good, suggests that the public is justified in expecting to benefit from its
investment. In particular, the public becomes a stakeholder in the prop-
erty produced by all funded research.
I observed earlier that purely private property claims can confer no
justifiable duty of charitable subsidization.' 82 Yet, given the realities of
federal spending on medical and health care research, purely private
property claims encompassed in private patents for products such as
179. Id. (quoting James P. Love, director of the Taxpayer Assets Project, founded by Ralph
Nader).
180. For discussion of the incentives rationale for the granting of patent monopolies, see supra
notes 58-74 and accompanying text.
181. See Carey, supra note 176 (observation attributed to Dr. Bruce A. Chabner, director of
cancer treatment at the National Institutes of Health).
182. See supra notes 148-59 and accompanying text.
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AZT are a legal fiction. Because governmental funding of medical re-
search is substantial and ubiquitous,1 13 potential public beneficiaries, in-
cluding prospective patients, have a stake in new products sufficient to
justify, at the very least, a voice in decisions regarding the sale and mar-
keting of those products. In other words, public support of quasi-public
goods must be balanced by some degree of public sharing in the fruits of
the investment, as well as input into the nature of that sharing. As we
cannot justify the expropriation of purely private property based simply
on the needs of others, so we cannot relegate to purely private benefit the
profits of endeavors that, by virtue of tax-base support, have become to
some degree public property.
I have argued that public support of AIDS research should give the
public a voice regarding the use of products developed through that re-
search based on a legitimate property stake. It does not necessarily fol-
low that the public will use its voice to plead for price concessions in
pharmaceutical sales. While the entire tax base supports the research
itself, only a small proportion of that tax base utilizes drugs developed in
the process. We cannot presume, without evidence, that the return
sought by all taxpayers is comprised, even in part, of price concessions
which will directly benefit only a relative few. Instead, it is incumbent
upon the government to listen to the public voice in a hearing process,
which would balance the just interests of both public and private stakes
in deciding how to utilize the assets at issue. The public's property inter-
est in the research and product development it has helped finance forms a
substantial part of the theoretical justification of negotiated pricing dis-
cussed in Part III. The negotiation process gives due recognition to all
legitimate interests in determining the extent to which public investment
should be repaid in the form of corporate pricing concessions.18 4
183. Even if a private company were to refuse any direct federal aid, its work is indirectly fi-
nanced by the funded research findings of university investigators and other laboratory scientists,
whose work is published and then exploited by all.
184. The public's stake in patented products can also be used to understand calls for unilateral
responsible pricing practices in lieu of regulation. Voluntary responsible pricing proposals have
arisen largely in response to price increases for existing drugs that exceed the rate of inflation. These
proposals typically suggest that drug companies might seek to avoid new regulation by volunteering
to hold price increases for existing drugs to the inflation rate. Because these proposals are more
relevant to drugs already on the market than to newly discovered drugs, I do not emphasize volun-
tary responsible pricing proposals in this Article. For further discussion of these proposals, see
supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
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III. IN SEARCH OF THE BEST POLICY: NEGOTIATED DRUG
PRICING-A MODEL FOR BALANCING DRUG ACCESSIBILITY
CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES
Recent public pressure regarding containment of health care costs has
raised old questions concerning regulation of the pharmaceutical indus-
try. As both AIDS activists and groups, such as the elderly, press Con-
gress to find ways of moderating the cost of necessary treatments, the
prospect of a regulated drug industry in the United States seems likely. I"
Regulatory possibilities include the development of governmental caps or
pricing schedules and a system of price negotiation similar to arbitration
proceedings.
Any regulatory scheme must address the potential discouragement of
research and development that is likely to result from a reduction of mo-
nopoly rents. In particular, if the government seeks to increase drug ac-
cessibility by limiting profits, it should adjust for resulting market
disincentives by increasing subsidies to private corporate research. The
obverse of this observation is also true: to the extent that government has
subsidized private research efforts and continues to do so into the future,
the public has a right to expect a return on its investment, which may
include price concessions.
This principle of governmental payment for regulatory monopoly con-
cessions is justified on numerous levels. Economically, the subsidies re-
store partially forfeited monopoly incentives to the level normally
attributable to exceptionally high demand for life-or-death products.
Moreover, governmental research allowances spread the cost of under-
writing AIDS research to the public at-large, rather than concentrating
expense directly upon drug companies and indirectly upon consumers. If
public policy demands that crucial product development be underwritten
by a broader base than the small minority who use the products, then the
public at-large should bear the expense of the subsidy. To charge compa-
nies with the entire cost of developing a quasi-public good is inequitable.
The entire citizenry should bear at least part of the cost of creating quasi-
public goods.
186
What kind of mechanism will provide for the fair and just pricing of
new AIDS drugs, given their status as quasi-public goods financed in
185. See Milt Freudenheim, Drug Makers Face Pressure to Restrain Price Increases, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 11, 1991, at 1.
186. See supra notes 174-83 and accompanying text.
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part by tax dollars? My recommendation is a negotiated drug pricing
model, under which industry and public representatives would enter a
bargaining process to develop prices. The concept is democratic and
would provide voting representation proportionate to the relative invest-
ment stakes of public and private interests. 187 Because input would be
commensurate with investment, I distinguish negotiated drug pricing
from ordinary instances of regulation, supposedly in the public interest,
that are not associated with public investment. Negotiated drug pricing
is not a form of governmental interference with private interests. Rather,
it is a mechanism supported by a substantial respect for property rights.
Negotiated drug pricing gives the public a say in the return it receives for
its portion of the investment in AIDS treatment research and develop-
ment. As such, the process is highly compatible with the desire for an
unfettered marketplace, wherein property owners are allowed to deter-
mine the use of their assets without undue governmental interference.188
Several important tasks must be addressed regarding negotiated mo-
nopoly pricing. These include: (1) establishing methods for allocating
public and private interests in patented drugs; (2) understanding the lim-
ited nature of the relationship between research as a quasi-public good
and price concessions; (3) avoiding product-to-market delays; and, (4)
providing a mechanism for reasonable price increases over the lifespan of
the drug. For the purposes of this analysis, I address each of these issues
briefly, although their elaboration remains an important challenge for
more detailed future analysis.
A. Establishing Methods for Allocating Public and Private Interests in
Patented Drugs
I have referred to scientific research findings as a quasi-public good for
two reasons: (1) because private research is funded by both public and
private sources, private and public interests should jointly own the prod-
ucts and processes obtained from that research;189 and, (2) the research
187. For discussion of the desirability of democratic rationing of health care in general, see
Fleck, supra note 134.
188. While negotiated pricing is compatible with a free-market economy, supply-side theory may
apply relatively ineffectually to the peculiarities of the drug industry. Regulatory intervention may
be justified by a recent report of the Office of Technology Assessment, which indicates that free-
market competition is an inadequate moderator of prices in the market for prescription drugs. Office
of Technology Assessment Report, Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs, Risks and Rewards, Reuter Tran-
script Rpt., Feb. 25, 1993.
189. See supra notes 174-83 and accompanying text.
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and the public health interests that research findings serve have divisible
and indivisible components. Given the free-market proposition that only
indivisible interests are centrally financed and thus regarded as public
goods,19 public health research falls between the categories and has at-
tributes of both public and private goods.191
The negotiation process recommended in this Part is meant to serve as
ground for mediating public and private interests in public health. If
negotiated pricing is implemented, an essential substantive concern
which will drive the bargaining process is how to assess the relative in-
vestments, and therefore the merited returns, of public and private stake-
holders. The creation of methods for assessing proportionate public and
private stakes requires economic study, recognizing both direct and indi-
rect forms of investment. For example, the public stake is likely to in-
clude both dollars donated to a particular research project and dollars
committed to basic university research upon which the particular project
is built.
B. Understanding the Limited Nature of the Relationship Between
Research as a Quasi-Public Good and Price Concessions
Public support of and the public stake in research productivity justify
broad-based input regarding the marketing of patented drugs. While the
public voice should be heard and weighed in the proposed negotiations,
society may expect return on its investment in forms other than con-
sumer price reductions. One cannot presume that representatives of tax-
payers will request exclusively, or even partially, price concessions in
exchange for their investment. The public may instead support diversion
of monopoly rents toward further research. 92 Likewise, society may
prefer that its subsidization of research be rewarded by returning the
public's share of the profits to the tax base, in order to reduce the federal
deficit.
I raise the very real possibility that the public may not support monop-
oly drug consumer subsidies because such subsidies disproportionately
190. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text. This Article proposes that regulation of
AIDS drug pricing should be predicated upon studies indicating the degree to which research and
development incentives are likely to be impaired. In drug pricing negotiations, the public should,
and probably will, consider the tradeoff between immediate, inexpensive access to new drugs, and
profit incentives that encourage pharmaceutical companies to develop future new drugs.
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benefit a small fraction of the taxpayer base which provided the original
investment. A majority of citizens may prefer to devote the public por-
tion of monopoly rents to further research or deficit reduction, in order
to spread the benefit more evenly. While PWAs benefit disproportion-
ately from monopoly price concessions, all of society shares in future
research aimed at eliminating a contagious disease or in reduction of the
deficit. From this standpoint, a decision during negotiations to support
price reductions is charitable in nature.
Of course, the best way to assess the public will is to provide a hearing
during pharmaceutical price negotiations. Survey research will provide
an important evidentiary component in this process. As stakeholders
and voters, it is incumbent on all citizens to examine carefully the issues
relevant to determining how best to contribute to the public good.
Lawyers and scholars should lead in this process. This Article con-
tends that the public should desire significant price concessions as part of
the return on its investment, both out of compassion and enlightened
self-interest.
L The Utility of Price Concessions as an Exercise of Compassion
Seriously or terminally ill patients experience great hardship when use-
ful or essential drugs are exorbitantly priced. Even representatives of the
drug industry have admitted that a need exists for cost-containment in
health care.'93 This need is particularly compelling for consumers of pat-
ented drugs for the treatment of deadly diseases.
The public may recognize the virtue of pricing subsidies by thinking of
its investment in terms of Rawlsian empathy.194 From a position of ra-
tional and mutually disinterested scrutiny,195 society has incentives to
conclude that the just distribution of life-saving drugs is that which pro-
vides universal access. This conclusion is reached by placing oneself in a
position that most will never occupy-the position of a person who can-
not afford an otherwise available, life-extending drug. In so doing, one
may become more receptive to the compassionate emotions suggested
193. Milt Freudenheim, Future Clouded at Drug Makers and Stocks Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,
1993, at Al, C15 (quoting a spokesperson of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association).
194. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). The reference to "Rawlsian empathy" is an
extension of Rawls's philosophy, rather than a direct application. Whereas Rawls refers to the origi-
nal condition, in which a veil of ignorance is employed in order to determine principles of distribu-
tive justice, this Article refers to that same condition more generically as a locus from which we may
be able to realize most fully our potential for compassion.
195. Id. at 13.
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earlier within the context of feminist ethics of care.1 9 6
This Article has suggested, in regard to legally coerced public price
subsidies, that the ethics of care could be subsumed within a free society,
but not vice versa. 197 The result of this line of reasoning was the rejec-
tion of mandatory, regulated care. Yet, when society votes to choose a
payoff for its public investment in private research as part of a process of
negotiated pricing, a vote of compassion is empathically rational without
being coercive.
2. The Utility of Price Concessions as an Exercise of Enlightened
Self-interest
While everyone enters the decision-making process with vested inter-
ests and relative advantages or disadvantages reflecting extant fortune,
no one is entirely secured of a harmless future. Even the healthiest, most
advantaged and optimistic view health insurance as a basic and desirable
product of fundamental utility. Tomorrow, one who has been most
blessed by good fortune may be faced with a crisis.
For this reason, it behooves all of society to enter into a social contract
in which the risk of vulnerability to exorbitantly priced drug treatments
is shared. It is rational, even from the standpoint of self-interest and
apart from considerations of compassion, to allocate to price subsidies
some portion of the return on public investment in research. By dividing
the public return between immediate price concessions and future invest-
ment in research, it is possible to strike a balance that benefits both the
short- and long-term interests of society at-large. Each person receives
the equivalent of public insurance against high prices in the event of ill-
ness, as well as the prospect of expunging AIDS.19
196. See SHERWIN, supra note 136, at 75, and accompanying text. Sherwin observes, "A femi-
nist moral relativism demands that we consider who controls moral decision-making within a com-
munity and what effect that control has on the least privileged members of that community."
197. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
198. While I have proposed compassion and the social contract as two compelling reasons to
vote for price concessions during negotiations, theoretical purists may not accept the arguments
posed by both simultaneously. This is because at some point, the feminist ethics of caring may come
into conflict with the presuppositions of social contract theory. In particular, formulation of a social
contract is predicated on acceptance of and respect for disparities of advantage and power. A possi-
ble middle ground, wherein compassion and social contract justifications may become more consis-
tent, is contained in the idea of "contractualism," which emphasizes moral consensus over the more
classical social contractarian seeking of self-interest. For a discussion of contractualism, see T.M.
Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (Amartya K. Sen &
Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
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C. Avoiding Product-to-Market Delays
In seeking to expedite the equitable distribution of new drugs consis-
tent with valid private and public expectations and property interests, it
is necessary to avoid establishing impediments to bringing products to
market as quickly as possible. In particular, when the legitimate public
voice is added to the decision-making process by negotiation or other-
wise, improvement in the quality of decision substance may come at the
price of delay.199 Because the life-and-death nature of AIDS treatment
exacerbates the harm associated with sluggish marketing, the avoidance
of bureaucratic obstacles is especially crucial.2 "° Yet easy agreement re-
garding price will be difficult to reach, given the divergent interests of
private corporations seeking to maximize profit and consumers attempt-
ing to minimize price.
Despite these inevitable difficulties, negotiated drug pricing must not
be discarded by lumping it into the category of unjustifiable governmen-
tal regulation or interference with private interests. As emphasized ear-
lier, the public's financial stake in AIDS research is direct and so
substantial that it justifies significant public ownership of resulting prod-
ucts. Unlike regulation that may be viewed by governmental minimalists
as intrusive, or as creating untenable public interests in private property,
public rights in AIDS drugs are supported by the numbers.
The difficult task, then, is to recognize the irrefutable public stake in
helping to determine new drug prices without creating unnecessary prod-
uct-to-market delay. In some ways, the interests of public and private
representatives are aligned in favor of expedient marketing. Potential
consumers want access to the product as soon as possible, and private
purveyors want to expedite profitable sales. Congruence of mission at
this level will temper, but not remove, conflicting interests over price.201
199. Delay is likely to result from goal conflict, when numbers of decision makers with divergent
interests increase. For discussion of the phenomenon and effects of goal conflict on decision-making,
see RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 117-25
(1963).
200. For discussion of the potential pitfalls of bureaucratic decision-making regarding public
policy and scientific research, see Harold P. Green, The Law-Science Interface in Public Policy Deci-
sionmaking, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 375, 400-402 (1990).
201. Analogously, labor disputes should be shortened because management wants a work force
to continue production while labor wants jobs to continue income flows. While this limited goal
congruence between management and labor should logically reduce the length of negotiation im-
passes, contract disputes and strikes still may linger longer than either side desires. Likewise, it must
be assumed that reductions in negotiation time for AIDS drug pricing will be limited by the intransi-
gence of sellers, buyers, or both, in regard to terms viewed as non-negotiable.
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In fashioning a workable system of negotiated drug pricing, it is neces-
sary to exploit incentive alignments and minimize dysfunctional adver-
sarial delay.
D. Providing a Mechanism for Reasonable Price Changes Over the
Lifespan of the Drug
Negotiated drug pricing is a solution to some of the conflicts that cur-
rently arise when a company is deciding the price at which to market a
new drug. Yet, subsequent pricing decisions must also be made to ac-
count for things like inflation, changes in industry cost structures, and
shifting competitive structures within the industry or within a particular
product-market segment. Just as the public has a stake in the initial pric-
ing decision, so it has a stake in subsequent pricing decisions that occur
over the life of the patent. A system of negotiated drug pricing must
provide a mechanism for alterations in pricing as well as initial market-
entry pricing decisions.
What factors should be considered in developing a system for pricing
changes? Most importantly, it is necessary to keep in mind the essence of
negotiated drug pricing: it is a method for allocating decision-making
authority to the true stakeholder-owners of patented products. The es-
sential requirements for a price-changing model are: (1) maintenance of
a policy-making voice that is representative of the stakeholder base; and,
(2) avoidance of unnecessary and harmful decision-making delay.
These two considerations are fundamentally at odds whenever deci-
sions are made. Adding a layer of decision makers with a perspective
that is potentially different from that of the incumbent decision makers
will tend to add new insights capable of improving the quality of deci-
sion. However, this new layer of decision makers will create a cost in
terms of expediency because difficulty in achieving consensus is magni-
fied by the number of voters.2 "2 Of course, the delay at this stage is prob-
ably less potentially harmful than delays that may occur during market
entry. When price change decisions are made, the product is already on
the market and the critical goal of quickly introducing the product is not
the concern. Still, undue delay in making necessary pricing alterations
can be harmful to both public and private interests and, therefore, must
be avoided.2 "3
202. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
203. Although this Article leaves the complete explication and development of the specific nego-
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IV. CONCLUSION
Regulatory initiatives regarding pricing of drugs for the treatment of
AIDS must carefully account for the ethics and economics of sound pub-
lic policy. This Article has attempted to present a balanced explication
of the most crucial considerations affecting the interests of patients, the
public at large, and private industry. My recommendation in favor of
negotiated drug pricing has been built on several observations.
First, all interests are best served by a public policy that maintains
incentives of the patent system which truly serve to expedite applied re-
search regarding causes and treatments of AIDS. Second, regulation
mandating private pricing concessions, or public subsidization of private
treatment, cannot legitimately be predicated upon rights culled carelessly
from the air, without due consideration of the legitimacy of the duties
which will inevitably be called upon in support of the proposed rights.
Third, notwithstanding such rigorous scrutiny, the public has a right to
insist on some return on its investment in both public and private forms
of research that redound to the benefit of private industry in the develop-
ment of patented products. This right is not preserved under the patent
system, which ascribes solely to the patent holder all proprietary rights
and interests in the patented product or process. Fourth, while the pub-
lic voice may insist on its return in forms other than price concessions,
both moral and pragmatic justifications exist for requesting price conces-
sions during negotiations. These justifications are both charitable, as em-
bodied in compassion, and self-interested, as incorporated into the social
contract. Last, regulation providing for acknowledgement of the public
stake in the quasi-public good of AIDS treatments must address product-
to-market issues. Policy makers must be particularly sensitive to the
need to expedite distribution of essential products by reducing bureau-
cratic impediments to product dispersion.
This Article has proposed negotiated drug pricing as a mechanism for
recognizing and protecting both the public and private interests in new
tiated drug pricing model for later analysis, two possibilities for pricing alteration policies should be
considered. First, pricing changes can be linked to stipulated strategic variables, such as the con-
sumer price index, spot-market prices for key inputs, and other fluctuating standards. Second, pub-
lic hearings could be implemented, extending the negotiation process from initial price
determinations to include subsequent changes as well. This process would probably resemble rate-
making hearings for public utilities. The former alternative seems preferable from at least one stand-
point-it is less bureaucratic, and thereby avoids the pitfall of creating a policy that is inexpedient
and unwieldy.
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products derived from research and development activity as currently
funded out of both sectors. The purpose of this Article is limited-it has
sought to provide the theoretical, principled justification for such a sys-
tem, given both the realities of economic incentive systems and the na-
ture of the rights and duties attached to all parties concerned.
Because the Article's approach is conceptual, it has placed little em-
phasis on the many questions that will inevitably be associated with im-
plementation. It has suggested that additional layers of public decision
makers, particularly those whose interests may be in conflict with private
corporate concerns, can be potentially harmful in effect. While the qual-
ity of pricing decisions should improve, reflecting both greater breadth of
informational input and more representative assertion of interests truly
at stake, the amount of time taken to arrive at pricing decisions is likely
to expand, given an expected diminution of consensus. Delays may also
occur because of bureaucratization of decision making which impedes
the socially desirable end of rapid distribution of essential pharmaceuti-
cal products.
These problems are merely suggestive of many potential difficulties
that are likely to be associated with the implementation of a negotiated
pricing system. While the scope of this Article has emphasized the theo-
retical over the practical, the next important step is the detailed explica-
tion of a practicable negotiation framework. As this Article's goal was
limited to providing economic and ethical justification for negotiated
pricing, future research questions addressing logistical concerns remain
to be examined.
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